What happened on February 28
At 11:47am Dhaka time, QatarEnergy issued a force majeure notification on its long-term LNG supply contract with Petrobangla. The stated reason: operational disruptions at the Ras Laffan Industrial City complex following the Hormuz Strait closure announced 72 hours earlier by Iranian naval command.
Bangladesh imports approximately 95% of its primary energy. Of that, LNG accounts for a rapidly growing share — from near zero in 2018 to the backbone of the country's gas-dependent power generation by 2026. When the QatarEnergy shipment stopped, the dominoes fell fast.
By the evening of February 28, the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) had initiated emergency load shedding protocols across all eight distribution zones. Rolling blackouts that had been running at 4–6 hours per day in district towns reached 10–14 hours overnight. In Dhaka, previously insulated neighbourhoods experienced 6–8 hour outages for the first time since 2010.
"Bangladesh's energy crisis is not a weather event. It is a structural event that was building for a decade."
The structural problem behind the immediate crisis
The QatarEnergy force majeure was the trigger, not the cause. Bangladesh's energy vulnerability has been building for fifteen years.
The country's domestic gas reserves — the backbone of power generation through the 2000s — have been declining since 2010. The Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation (PETROBANGLA) estimates a 1.22 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) structural gas deficit. That deficit existed before February 28. It exists independently of the Hormuz situation. It will exist after any diplomatic resolution.
The government responded to declining domestic gas by building LNG import infrastructure — floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) at Moheshkhali — and signing long-term supply contracts. What it did not build was energy independence. Bangladesh traded one dependency (domestic gas) for another (imported LNG).
Four facts from the first 30 days
- Universities across Bangladesh suspended in-person classes within 72 hours. The combination of unreliable power and internet disruptions made continued operations impractical.
- Fuel rationing began at petrol stations in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet within the first week. Queue times of 2–4 hours were reported.
- The Bangladesh Fertiliser Association reported that 4 of the 5 state-owned fertiliser factories had halted or severely reduced production by Day 10 due to gas supply cuts.
- LNG spot prices on the JKM (Japan-Korea Marker) benchmark reached USD 45–70 per mmBtu — levels not seen since the European winter crisis of 2022. Bangladesh, as a price-taker on spot markets, could not absorb these prices at scale.
What this means for households
Load shedding in Bangladesh is not new. It has been a feature of daily life for two decades. What changed after February 28 is the duration and predictability.
Before the crisis, load shedding in major cities ran on a rough schedule — 2–4 hours in the afternoon, occasionally at night. Businesses and households planned around it. After February 28, that pattern broke. Outages became longer (10–18 hours in district towns), less predictable, and more frequent in urban centres that had previously been partially protected.
The practical consequence: an IPS or generator that was sized for 4-hour outages is now undersized. Lead-acid IPS batteries that were already degraded are now cycling multiple times per day, accelerating failure. Diesel generator costs — already ৳4,000–7,000 per month for a typical business — are now higher as fuel prices track global oil markets.
"The crisis exposed what was already broken. The answer is not to wait for it to end."
Will it get better?
Diplomatically, yes — the Hormuz situation will likely resolve within 6–18 months. Structurally, no — the 1.22 bcfd gas deficit is a geological and infrastructural reality that does not resolve with diplomacy.
The Bangladesh government has announced emergency procurement of additional FSRUs and fast-tracked renewable energy tender processes. These are 24–36 month timelines at minimum. The honest outlook for 2026–2027 is 4–8 hours of daily load shedding even after the acute Hormuz crisis stabilises.
This is not a temporary emergency. It is a permanent change in the operating environment for households and businesses in Bangladesh. The families and businesses that treat it as permanent infrastructure — and invest accordingly — will fare better than those waiting for a return to normal.
What AAA Battery is doing about it
We built the Nano for this moment. Not because the crisis created an opportunity, but because the structural problem was visible for years and nobody had built a D2C, honestly-priced solar + LiFePO4 product for Bangladesh's specific conditions — moderate budgets, extreme heat, frequent load shedding, and a market full of lead-acid IPS systems that keep failing.
The Nano starts at ৳38,000 installed. It runs fans, lights, TV, and phone charging for 6–10 hours on a single charge. It recharges from the sun. It does not use diesel. It does not require maintenance. It uses LiFePO4 (Lithium Iron Phosphate — the safest battery chemistry) — rated for 3,000+ cycles and capable of operating at 60°C — because Bangladesh's heat destroys lesser batteries.
It is not a temporary fix. It is permanent infrastructure at a price families can actually afford.